(This is a follow-on piece to my earlier article ‘Who is responsible for Dhruv ALH longest-ever grounding?’ published on Sep 27, 2025. You can access it here)

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The latest grounding of ALH and the opacity of information in public domain that typically shrouds any such investigation involving service helicopters and HAL has fuelled the usual debates in print and online media. In Apr this year, a few vocal critics were targeted in a pointed press release by HAL that attempted to curb bad press while hiding under the umbrella of MoD and convenient non-disclosure clauses. Among other inane complaints, HAL made a case that such critics/bloggers present a one-sided view without HAL’s consultation. The HAL press release came under widespread criticism for the tone and tenor of public communication at a time when the fleet was still grounded. The Apr 11, 2025 statement (L) and my response posted on LinkedIn (R) are placed below.

In the previous blog post, I had covered HAL Chairman’s interview with NDTV and explained their attempts to defend the indefensible in the wake of every such setback. In an organisation not usually known for being forthcoming, HAL officials in senior positions, serving & retired, are now seen joining the debate that erupts after every crash. This is a welcome change for an organisation that badly needs the disinfectant of public debate to unearth uncomfortable facts that have thus far remained locked within the high walls of their design and production centres.

A designer’s view

One such post by Syam Nath, a former Executive Director and erstwhile General Manager of HAL’s elite Rotary Wing Research and Design Centre (RWRDC) caught my eye few weeks ago. In my view, the top designer’s elaborate post on Facebook of 22nd Apr did not get the attention it deserved.

HAL in the Apr 11 press release had sought to classify its critics as “Defence analysts, former pilots, officers of the Defence Forces and armchair critics“. As a longtime veteran of HAL who rose to the position of ED (JV & OS), Syam Nath cannot be dismissed under any of the descriptions above. He has intimate knowledge of the program and has had in-depth access to ALH data right from inception till his retirement. When I first read his post, I held my counsel since Op Sindoor was ongoing. Recent comments from CMD HAL in an interview to NDTV indicate that the organisation is only trying to paper over major concerns voiced by Syam Nath and many others.

The veteran designer’s post has brought to fore new facets of the navy/CG ALH saga that make the road ahead arguably challenging. His full post on FB can be accessed here. I have examined below, a few salients of his post and its ramifications for the navy/CG.

Problem isolated to batch of ALH Mk3MR?

The author begins by stating that “an inspection of the Swash Plates of a large number of ALH’s has revealed that there are multiple occurrences of cracks on the Swash Plates of the ALH Mk-III Wheeled version helicopters used by the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard. No such cracks have been noticed in any other variant of the ALH“. This is an emphatic statement and possibly draws from the author’s sources within HAL. A key takeaway is that such failures have NOT been detected on the older ALH Mk1 wheeled variants held with the navy and CG. The risk of misreading correlation for causation would have been considered by Syam before making this statement. Based on the above finding, Syam has inferred that “a Swash Plate failure has been unprecedented in ALH’s long operational history. Therefore, a fundamental design flaw should logically be ruled out”. Prima facie, this is a valid inference and isolates the problem to the latest batch of 16+16 ALH Mk3MRs supplied to the In and CG.

At this point, I am cannot help but recall HAL’s consistent treatment of past woes of the ALH that have brought us to this pass — the tendency to normalise design, manufacturing or testing shortfalls as one-off unprecedented occurrences till body bags pile up high enough to escape scrutiny. The same was said of lateral cyclic saturation (unspoken, untrained for & undocumented till a fatal crash of Sarang in 2007 claimed two lives), control/booster rod failures and what has come to be the bane of ALH — premature withdrawals of the Integrated Dynamic System (IDS). The CMD in his NDTV interview never ventured into these dark alleys.

Wheel versus skid

He goes on to state “No Swash Plate cracks have been noticed in the Skid version ALHs during the ongoing inspections. Therefore, a strong case can be made for this variant to be allowed to resume flights, thus offering a huge logistical relief to the beleaguered IAF and Indian Army fleet“. This assertion, possibly drawn from the DI committee findings, leads the discussion into new pathways of “usage pattern” and “type of landing gear”. It is highly unlikely that prodigious designers from HAL chanced upon the implications of wheeled landing gear on transmission and upper controls only after two decades of operational exploitation. Navy and CG ALH Mk1 with wheeled landing gear have operated extensively for over two decades with no NRSB or control actuator failure. This brings the spotlight back on the batch of 16+16 brand-new ALH Mk3MRs supplied to the IN & CG.

The most salient difference between IN/ICG ALH and army/IAF versions is the landing gear. Navy/CG operate the wheeled landing gear version of ALH whereas others predominantly use the skid variant. Selection of type of landing gear by a user is dictated by intended usage and fitness for purpose. The weight category of the helicopter also puts practical limits on what type of landing gear can be adopted. The 5.5-ton ALH Mk1 that IN and CG inducted early this millenium have retractable wheel landing gear. The 5.75-ton enhanced maximum all-up weight (MAUW) ALH Mk3MR that IN and CG inducted between 2021-23 have non-retractable, fixed wheel landing gear. Practically, this MAUW defines the outer limit for skid landing gear usually used on light helicopters. To be sure, skid landing gear is not incompatible with ship decks. The workhorse of offshore helicopter industry — Bell Flight’s BH-412 — has dominated the industry for over three decades with a simple skid landing gear. More on this topic here.

Lack of marinisation, fatigue or inadequate mapping of loads?

Based on these findings, the former designer has concluded “something unique about the usage pattern and spectrum of the IN and CG ALHs which has reduced the fatigue life of the Swash Plate by two orders of magnitude“. If true, this is evidence of inadequate mapping of loads or insufficient testing for marine use. Seen in light of the CMD’s latest assertions, this only exposes gross knowledge gaps, or worse–refusal to admit shortfalls in design, testing and certification. It only strengthens this writer’s view drawn from real-life experiences that HAL suffers from deep organisational myopia. They are loath to acknowledge or wilfully ignorant of the operating environment of marine users.

ALH have been operating with the IN and CG now for over 22 years with an accident-free record till IN 709 ditched off Mumbai. Syam’s hypothesis by itself is a damning indictment of the manner in which HAL has mapped fundamental user requirements, much less meet their operational expectations. Further, the 16+16 ALH Mk3MR supplied to IN and CG are brand new airframes with an order of magnitude lesser marine exposure compared to the Mk1s which were inducted early this millennium. Possibility of manufacturing/fabrication defects in the Mk3MR swash plates/NRSB that could have crept in while servicing an order for 32 helicopters post haste is the elephant in the room HAL seems to be unwilling to accept, much less address. Instead, specious arguments around usage pattern, maintenance and type of operation are being advanced at the topmost levels.

Blaming users or shooting messengers won’t help

The navy has been operating helicopters from ships way before the ALH appeared on drawing boards. IN’s woes with shipborne helicopters actually started with the ALH program where tri-service specifications led to design compromises that were foisted on the navy (and ICG) who held minority stake in the program (rigid rotors, blade folding, marinisation, shipboard compatibility, range and endurance, to name a few). The same organisation who sold lofty dreams of a light multirole helicopter for shipboard use who are now raising fundamental questions about the ability of key components to withstand the marine environment. Did not the same HAL clear the Coast Guard’s ALH Mk3MR for all-weather shipboard use after a 2-day trial off Chennai in 2023? Now two decades after the first IN/CG ALH squadrons were commissioned and after four brand-new helicopters from a batch of 16+16 supplied to the IN+CG have crashed with loss of six lives, we are discovering basics of shipborne helicopters?

Deal breakers

I appreciate and compliment Syam Nath’s candid views on a subject which others from his organisation have hitherto shied away from enunciating in public. However, I have one bone to pick with his FB post–his explanation about taxying techniques contributing to NRSB fatigue failure. In my view, both taxying techniques described by Syam in his post are inherently flawed and the conclusions drawn are debatable. Every ALH comes with a ‘cyclic neutral indicator’ (CNI) and ‘mast moment indicator’ (MMI) that provide handling cues to the pilot when the helicopter (wheeled or skid) is on ground. There are well defined MMI limits in the flight manual (green, amber, red) every ALH pilot is taught to respect. Only a deliberately incompetent crew would disregard CNI or exceed MMI limits while ground taxying. This hypothesis is unlikely to be accepted by anyone from the services (or even HAL flight operations).

The writer has also questioned the proportion of time spent on taxying and made a recommendation that “excessive practice take-offs and landings, especially from ship decks, might also need to be avoided“. This is an absolute deal-breaker for an offshore or shipborne helicopter. The ALH is already a maintenance-intensive helicopter with more tail than teeth. Any attempt to review and revise upward the fatigue load/cycle estimates and reduce life of critical components will only aggravate an already stressed situation for the navy/CG with no meaningful payoffs other than flogging a dead horse.

Manpower shortages ignored

Syam Nath has also penned a detailed article in Economic Times on manpower shortages in workmen and executive cadre at HAL that could sound the death knell for future programs. He has opined with facts that “the organisational structure increasingly resembles an army of officers and generals – with too few soldiers to execute the mission“. In keeping with the abject lack of national appetite for bad news, this well-researched article with deep implications for national security projects of the future also seems to have been given the “all is well, all is well” treatment by HAL and its masters in MoD. If this organisation is expected to deliver 5th generation fighters and deck-based multi-role helicopters, something drastic has to change. Syam has made pointed recommendations. Do read his Jun 2025 piece in ET here.

A long rope, use it wisely

As of now, there is no visibility on when navy and CG ALH will return to the air once again. It could be at least 6-8 months if not more. To my mind, HAL is rather clueless how to proceed further. The recent turn of events and the helpless situation that users find themselves in should inform policymakers in navy/CG and civil offshore about the fragility of parking all their eggs with any one organisation, public or private. If recent social media posts, interviews and press releases by HAL are any indication, arrogance, ignorance and rigidity of thought is gaining ascendency over transparency, scientific method and accountability. This is a dangerous trend. Customers who continue their dalliance with HAL for big-ticket programs on which pivot national security, safety or profits would do well to draw their own red lines. Not every customer has the luxury of being grounded for nine months and then lectured.

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© KP Sanjeev Kumar, 2025. All rights reserved.

Views expressed are personal except where quoted, written with a view to raise awareness and contribute to flight safety. Feel free to debate and contribute to the discourse. Please keep the comments respectful and civil. I can be reached at realkaypius@gmail.com or on my X handle @realkaypius.