In the recently concluded biennial aerospace and defence exposition Aero India 2025, helicopters from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) stable were conspicuous by their absence. This was in stark contrast to the 2023 air show where HAL’s Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) and Light Combat Helicopter (LCH ‘Prachand’) dominated the skies over Yelahanka air force base. The 2023 edition was preceded by the inauguration a week before of India’s largest helicopter manufacturing facility on Feb 6. This factory spread over 615 acres has been set up by HAL at Tumakuru, about 70 miles outside Bengaluru, for series production of the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH). The LUH was unveiled by PM Narendra Modi on the occasion even as the first production LUH rolled out of HAL’s Bengaluru plant.
The ALH-LCH family of helicopters is facing one of their longest groundings in recent times after catastrophic failure in a critical flight control component brought down another helicopter. The Jan 5, 2025 crash of CG 859 at Porbandar destroyed three lives and shattered HAL’s assurances that “incidents linked to control rod failure will not recur”. The root cause is yet to be addressed and there is evidence that the weak link has shifted elsewhere in the flight control circuit. Meanwhile, the fleetwide grounding leaves a serious capability gap for the Indian armed forces, heavily dependent as they are on these helicopters from sea level to super high altitude.
Showstopper LUH, but no orders?
Against this grim backdrop, the only saving grace for HAL’s rotary show in Aero India 25 was the 3-ton Light Utility Helicopter (LUH). Performing deft manoeuvres in front of an international audience of A&D majors, aviation enthusiasts and potential civil and military customers, the little birdie managed to salvage the show for HAL and India’s ‘Make in India’ campaign. Important dignitaries and VIPs availed demonstration flights on the light single-engine helicopter flown by HAL test pilots. While the army chief skipped the demo flight, IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal AP Singh and Civil Aviation Minister Kinjarapu Ram Mohan Naidu flew in the LUH. These three senior dignitaries form the trident of apex decision makers who will sign off on potential induction of LUH in service and civil aviation. HAL is also positioning the LUH as a product with potential civil application. This has been revealed during formal and informal interactions as early as DefExpo 2020. The order books are empty on that side though. One look at the brief history and sharp ascent of the LUH as a serious replacement for ageing Chetak/Cheetah helicopters will raise the obvious question in any analyst’s mind: why hasn’t the LUH found acceptance even after five years of Initial Operational Clearance (IOC)?
The answer is not to be found in feet-dragging, internal bureaucracy, or the complex procurement procedures of India, as is made out to be the case in uninformed debates around this topic. It is likely far more specific this time.
Serious concerns raised by one of HAL’s own
As per confirmed sources, a senior IAF veteran and experimental test pilot (ETP) under HAL employment had warned officials within the company of serious design issues in LUH early in the program. When his concerns were not heeded and HAL looked poised for signing of the 12 Limited Series Production (LSP) contract despite serious gaps in critical flight tests, the ETP followed his chain of command and escalated his concerns to Chairman HAL as early as November 2023. It is learnt that an internal committee was set up by HAL to look into the concerns. Due procedure was followed and meaningful interactions were held between design experts and concerned test crew within HAL. However, the design solutions subsequently tabled failed to adequately address any of the root causes or assuage his concerns, some of which he described to this author as bordering on “preposterous”.
Having been associated with the LUH program from its early stages and finding himself always at odds with HAL’s handling of safety-critical issues, the senior veteran pulled out of the project, devoting his energies to other ongoing programs. When it was evident that hapless customers would likely be at the receiving end of the program’s indiscretions, the ETP escalated his concerns to the service headquarters through an unclassified letter in Sep 24, immediately post his retirement from HAL. He is yet to receive any response to the letter.
This likely explains the delay in signing of 12 LSP contract. If the concerns are found true and valid, it is alarming that certification agencies such as CEMILAC and DGQA handed out IOC certificate and even allowed customer demonstration flights during successive air shows. As of now, there is no evidence that his concerns have been invalidated, neither by HAL nor by experts from services that have analysed the matter.
As an avid observer and a keen follower of indigenous developments in this area, I was made aware of these concerns months ago through casual interactions with both sides of the customer-OEM fence. I refrained from making any commentary on the subject for two main reasons: Firstly, my hope that the department at the vanguard of protecting safety of this machine, viz. HAL Flight Operations, will exercise their authority and walk back the design if required. Secondly, Aero India is OUR show; not the time to spook display pilots or audience with safety concerns they hardly understand. Both my hopes were dashed after I watched the proceedings of Aero India 2025 & LUH customer flights in mute disbelief.
Autorotation
The primary area of concern is learnt to be autorotation — viz, the capability of a helicopter to land off a complete power loss (engine failure). Federal regulations (and commonsense) require that “rotorcraft must be able to be landed with no excessive vertical acceleration, no tendency to bounce, nose over, ground loop, porpoise, or water loop, and without exceptional piloting skill or exceptionally favorable conditions“. For single-engine helicopters, such capability must be demonstrated in “power off” mode from steady state autorotation. The ETP has raised serious concerns about LUH ability to meet this specification.
The problem in the main seems to be one of high landing speed, viz. inability to land off an autorotation at a speed that is survivable in any but the perfect setting of an airfield. From my experience as an ETP and test flying instructor, during actual full-down autorotation (steady state, forward flight and free air hover autos with throttle to idle / fuel flow control lever back), low time pilots generally end up landing at higher speeds than desirable, even though perfect zero-speed touchdowns are possible on almost all light helicopters. If experienced ETPs have not been able to achieve such landings, the outcome will in all likelihood be catastrophic in the hands of line pilots up against an actual engine failure.
I have covered the topic of ‘autorotation’ elaborately in an earlier write-up (read here). Except for a limited height-velocity envelope, the capability to land safely off an autorotation after engine failure is non-negotiable in any light single-engine helicopter. It is the key to survival, indeed the final ace up any helicopter pilot’s sleeve. Aspects such as healthy pilot reaction time to respond to engine failure, handling qualities in autorotation, glide ratio, rotor inertia and touchdown speed (as close to zero as possible) should be considered “essential”. It is also a prerequisite for certification. In 2020 when LUH was awarded IOC, it is likely that HV diagram was not even charted, let alone adequately tested. One can only worry about a system that hands out IOC and allows customer demo flights with such critical gaps in flight testing.
Directional stability
The secondary area of concern highlighted by the HAL ETP pertains to directional stability of the LUH — viz, the piloting effort required to maintain the helicopter’s heading in various conditions of flight. Light single-engine helicopters should have Level 1 handling qualities (HQR 1-3) in basic configuration (without autopilot / stability augmentation). This should also be considered a non-negotiable requirement since such helicopters are often flown single-pilot or by crew with entry-level experience. If an experienced test pilot rates the directional stability characteristics above HQR 3 (for basic manoeuvres), it means “unsatisfactory”; it warrants improvement and should not be released to customer without due correction. An HQR 6 for instance places it in the “very objectionable but tolerable” category. A copy of the Cooper-Harper rating scale for handling qualities assessment is placed below.
It is likely that a stability augmentation system (SAS) and/or autopilot (AP), not originally envisaged or part of customer specification, will have to be incorporated into design to overcome or mask such objectionable characteristics. This adds a needless level of complexity to an entry-level platform. If the helicopter requires SAS for flying in visual meteorological conditions (VMC) or for undertaking flights under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), the death traps of spatial disorientation (SD) and/or loss of control inflight (LOC-I) will always lurk around the corner while flying in marginal conditions or with SAS/AP off or unserviceable. And here’s the catch. Such accidents usually end up being classified ‘Human Error (Aircrew)’, masking the sinister underlying causal factor: the basic helicopter is simply too difficult to fly without assistance of SAS/AP. This is unacceptable for a light single-engine helicopter, the ETP contends.
Serious flaws but IOC awarded?
It is inexplicable how such serious observations were normalised by the company and kept away from potential customers and certification agencies. The LUH self-deployed from Bengaluru to Ladakh in Sep 2019 for “hot and high” trials when even the HV diagram was not tested. Members from the IAF, Indian Army, certification and quality assurance agencies were also in attendance. What explains such an approach to flight testing? Were test crew from all sides appraised of the autorotation characteristics of LUH? Were they adequately protected or covered by insurance for forays out of the airfield area where an engine failure would demand an immediate autorotative landing? If internally there were any rumblings, it was well hidden from outside agencies. The ETP subsequently broke ranks and put his worries on record in Nov 2023. Did HAL downplay the concerns as unduly alarmist or not worthy of serious course correction? Or did they envisage interim solutions to somehow push for the 12 LSP contract, while buying time to let the customer deal with long-term implications? Both these possibilities hold serious portends for the program’s future.
An observation from an earlier article I had penned is reproduced below for emphasis:
In my experience, HAL has always resorted to band-aid fixes and additional warning/cautions rather than walking back a design, that too after much blood was spilt. Ego and pet peeves have often ruled over prudence and a long-term perspective on safety. Regulators and certification authorities have stepped in far too late, if at all. If the last gate of safety in HAL — the elite team of test pilots and test engineers in HAL Flight Operations — also start toeing the party line rather than going for ‘precision and excellence’ in flight testing, we are looking at a very bleak future.
Much as I hate to admit, if the ETP’s concerns return to haunt customers tomorrow, the lion’s share of blame will rest with HAL Flight Operations and their collective failure to act as the last gate of quality. Both concerns fall squarely in their domain and they have the last word on it. Further, flight test groups from army (AAPT) & air force (HPMT), embedded in HAL for a purpose, should have done their own due diligence without waiting for a whistleblower. If these agencies are penetrated by compliant crew looking for employment opportunities in HAL, more’s the pity.
Shooting the messenger won’t solve
I have been a silent admirer of the LUH from the word go. Having known all test crew behind the program intimately and watching/reporting on the early successes of this program, it will be deeply disappointing if concerns that potentially fall in the “unacceptable” basket are airbrushed by those presiding over the planning, execution and approval of the LUH flight test program.
The situation that obtains today offers no comfort or optimism. The veteran test pilot of HAL has had to seek relief from the Honourable Karnataka High Court after HAL withheld his retirement benefits stating an unrelated case from his service days. This is petty, highly vindictive and sends a chilling message to flight test crew to “fall in line”. The test pilot’s open letter to CMD HAL and the internal committee report on concerns raised by him have been tabled in the High Court should some journalist decide to do his/her job. It is a ‘David versus Goliath’ situation, compounded by the huge backlog of cases Indian courts have to deal with. The veteran test pilot ex-IAF, a thorough professional, always forthright and diligent to a fault, would have known only too well that he is swimming against the tide at the fag end of his professional career. To speak up when nobody else did, to put his reputation on the line, to put pen to paper when he could have easily faded into quiet retirement — should inform us of the seriousness of the matter. Also on display here on his part are SCIENCE, CONSCIENCE and INTEGRITY — the bedrock of flight testing.
The LUH is the first single-engine helicopter to be built in India from the drawing board up. Nobody expects us to get everything right in the first instance. What matters is how we go about fixing issues as they come up. There is always the easy route to pushing a product on hapless customers with glaring shortfalls in basic design, taking cover under so-called ‘gold-plated’ user requirements and arcane military/civil specifications borrowed to suit own convenience. There is the ‘harder right’ route to owning up challenges that come up during development and working through them in a manner that not only satisfies a captive local market, but appeals to a larger, international customer base. The former will leave a trail of blood long after people driving the decisions today fade into oblivion. The latter will produce a peerless world-class product that truly reflects the spirit of Make in India. Hoping for good luck is never an effective strategy.
LUH is at that crossroad today. Here’s hoping we choose the harder right over the easier wrong.
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© KP Sanjeev Kumar, 2025. All rights reserved.
Views expressed are personal except where quoted from primary source, written with a view to raise awareness and contribute to flight safety. Feel free to debate and contribute to the discourse meaningfully. Any response received from HAL representatives on the subject will be carried in a subsequent article or posted in comments section. I can be reached at realkaypius@gmail.com.
1. Ref “If an experienced test pilot rates the directional stability characteristics above HQR 3 (for basic manoeuvres), it means “unsatisfactory” ”
The use of the phrase “above HQR 3” is misleading. Better to use the phrase “worse than HQR 3.”
2. Ref “What explains such an approach to flight testing? ”
Both CEMILAC and DGCA do not have test pilots and flight test engineers in their organisation. That is one reason why we are importing lakhs of crores worth of aircraft, aeroengines and components every year.
You have rightly said, that the system that permits IOC and other clearances without a demonstrated zero speed autorotation capability leaves much to be desired. Not only this, the final brick wall of safety between the manufacturer and the end customer is indeed the HAL Flight Operations. Line pilots like me look to the hallowed tribe of ETPs to hand us helicopters that will ensure safe return to ground under any circumstances, with minimum pilot skills.
Most of us like pilots do not go into the deeper characteristics of helicopters that you have discussed in your article. We have blind faith in the testing ethos and ethics that finally clear a helicopter for unrestricted operations. If this golden shield has indeed been taken away from us, like you bring out, then it is indeed a dark day for aviation in India. And a dark day for military pilots too, because no civil operator will touch this helicopter with a barge pole. HAL will go back to the captive customer base, and keep pushing helicopters on to unsuspecting pilots with promises of improvement in future builds. There needs to be no concessions in the critical areas and the certification agencies need to independently turn down any further testing until critical points are addressed in toto.
As a long-time instructor, I have trained dozens of eager young pilots and sent them solo in the Alouette 3. The critical test in the all-important solo check was his ability to demonstrate a safe autorotation. Now we are told that the LUH won’t be able to autorotate down to zero speed. It sends shivers down my spine knowing that a recently solo-cleared pilot would have to contend with a running landing, praying that he has an engine failure nowhere other than at 1000 feet over a runway with no other distractions.
The only other single engine helicopter that HAL manufactured was the Alouette series with superb autorotation characteristics. One Naval pilot (Commander MK Singh) managed to put down the helicopter on a dark night, after his engine almost exploded and made his cockpit dark. He successfully autorotated and landed with zero speed in Visakhapatnam. When they went to recover the helicopter at night, everyone was absolutely surprised at the landing – there were high tension pylons within a 100 meters almost all around, and the helicopter only had a few dents on the tail guard. THAT is the level of confidence in the helicopter which HAL and the test crew must ensure.
Flying a helicopter without autopilot / SAS fitted needs to be a simple task for a stable helicopter. The same one with an autopilot becomes very difficult to handle when the system is unserviceable. We had some, Alouette III / Chetaks with the AP 146 fitted. They became very difficult to fly with the system switched off. God forbid if the AP on the LUH trips, then the helicopter will become doubly difficult to fly, with terrible handling qualities. All autopilot aircraft have a maximum speed limit for flying without the AP. If the AP trips beyond this speed, serious control difficulties will emerge. You have rightly pointed out that this will get classified as a pilot error, with little regard to basic stability characteristics of the helicopter.
It is most unfortunate that HAL has started victimising one of their own for bringing out all this, that too following the proper reporting channels. It speaks volumes of the veteran test pilot’s conscience and desire to get things right. If this is allowed to continue then there will be no dissenting voices, and the result will be fatalities in the field. But by then, the contracts would have been signed, and the cash registers ringing. Human lives will only become a statistic – other’s lives of course, because the powers that be are never going to be around to see and fly in the LUH with military colours
I do hope that this helicopter does not get pushed on to the customers without fixing everything BEFORE even the LSP models begin taking shape.
Hope HAL will fix all the issues and Services will evaluate the helo diligently with all sincerity
It’s indeed very courageous of the Test Pilot for calling a spade a spade and sparing Services many embarrassments in future.
Infact when any one of us test/accept the machine for SERVICES we need to be as honest & dutiful as we are at LOC. Letting the machine pass with shortcomings and deficiency is like knowingly letting infiltration go on across the LOC in front of our eyes. It’s as simple as that. It’s better to sacrifice one’s career for taking a stand rather than later sacrifice many lives due to bending one’s back.
If we, the TESTERS & ACCEPTORS of machines on behalf of defence forces are up to our duty we don’t need any major POLICY shift by big wigs while acquiring aircrafts or machines for our Services and in turn we would be saving many valuable lives in future.
Your analysis of the LUH programme is excell nts a user you have put the issues I aright perspective. Needs a conscious introspective to ensure LUH is produced to meet all customer expecations’
sir, what have you been doing all these years.?..afraid that you will loose your job, promotion etc.? personnel from IAF and MoD attend review meetings to eat chai biscuits and sumptuous lunch. nobody from the MoD organizations have grip on the subject and just show their bodily presence. This happens in every meeting. nobody likes to bell the cat in those review meetings. “All is well” signed on the MoM at the end.
sir, why ppl are silent all these years.? personnel from IAF and MoD attend review meetings . nobody from the MoD organizations have grip on the subject and just show their presence. This happens in every meeting. nobody likes to bell the cat in those review meetings. “All is well” signed on the MoM at the end.
Extremely disturbing observations Kaypius. Hope the powers involved exercise due diligence to take the right steps and not shoot the messenger.