In a recent interview with NDTV on the grounding of Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH), the Chairman and Managing Director of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) Dr. DK Sunil was quoted as saying “out of the four crashes that have happened, three in the Coast Guard and one in the Navy, three of them are because of other reasons. It is not manufacturing; it is not related to the design. There were issues either related to maintenance or in terms of the operation“.

The last four crashes in question involved latest ALH Mark III Maritime Role (ALH Mk3MR) helicopters, 16 each of which were delivered to the navy and coast guard in the 2021-23 timeframe. All four accidents occurred in the last two years, grounding the entire fleet for extended durations in the face of grave national security challenges. HAL CMD’s remark seems to shrug off HAL responsibility in three out of four accidents. This is deeply problematic and merits deeper examination.

Background

The grounded fleet of over 330 indigenous Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH) slowly started taking to the air in May 2025, four months after the Jan 5 fatal accident of Indian Coast Guard (ICG) ALH Mk3MR CG-859. The resumption in flying was announced through a post dated May 1, 2025 by the helicopter’s manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) on X (formerly Twitter). The timing of that announcement couldn’t have been more fortuitous. The nation was bristling after the terrorist attack at Pahalgam and some kind of retaliation was in the offing. About a week later, Indian armed forces launched Operation Sindoor against terrorist camps in Pakistan. The four-day conflict saw the nuclear-armed neighbours launch stand-off attacks and counterattacks on each other. The services (& HAL) narrowly escaped the ignominy of seeing their frontline fleet of indigenous utility and attack helicopters benched through an armed conflict which could have escalated into all-out war.

Ditching of IN-709

Navy’s first ALH Mk3MR IN-709 ditched off Mumbai on 08 Mar 23 after a catastrophic booster rod failure led to sudden loss of power and rapid loss of height. All three crew members were rescued and the aircraft was retrieved from sea after a copybook water landing. The immediate cause was reported to be booster rod failure. At least 5-6 such failures have happened in the past (some fatal), but the most clear cut evidence of this failure was available only after IN-709 accident. This led to a fleet-wide grounding, a naval board of inquiry, and Defect Investigation (DI) committee. Classified reports were submitted up the respective reporting chains. IN-709 was just out of a major inspection by HAL and duly accepted by the IN. So who was responsible for “maintenance” that brought down a brand-new helicopter? If components in the flight control chain were designed, tested and certified fit for purpose, why did they fail now & on previous occasions? If some sub-component at the eye-end or fork-end was vulnerable, whose job is it to identify and fix the design before it causes multiple accidents? These questions remain unanswered.

Incorrectly installed control rods – CG855

Shortly after IN-709 ditching, CG-855, another brand-new ALH Mk3MR crashed at Kochi international airport (26 Mar 23). HAL’s rotary line was under serious scrutiny at this time with the entire fleet grounded and many unanswered questions about reliability and maintainability of key components. Legacy control rods were in the process of being removed, tested, and reinstalled on all ALH at HAL’s behest. No decision had yet been taken to lift the grounding by India’s Centre for Military Airworthiness and Certification (CEMILAC). Yet the ICG, riding on a Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contract signed with HAL (that supported a steep flying task every month), succumbed to its own pressures.

Journalists with an investigative nose should have asked who installed those control rods incorrectly and under whose supervision. Shouldn’t the HAL PBL on-site team have undertaken this crucial activity in the wake of IN-709 accident? How did they run all the red lights in maintenance manuals, training, independent & supervisory checks & balances to swap lateral and longitudinal control rods that cost the exchequer a brand-new multi-million dollar machine? Were the rods so identically designed & marked that even HAL technicians couldn’t differentiate one from the other? If there was no design or manufacturing issue, why was the decision taken to replace them with steel control rods across the fleet? Who foots the bill for all this ‘hit and trial’ a quarter century after induction? Did any heads roll in HAL for this accident or only uniformed personnel were punished? Again, no answers have been tabled in public except passing this off as a one-off “maintenance issue”.

What set up the night accident of CG-863?

The fatal crash of CG-863 while on a night rescue mission in stormy weather on Sep 2, 2024 marked the second hull loss of CG’s Mk3MR fleet. By now, serious questions should have been raised about the sustainability of ICG’s flying tempo driven by a very expensive PBL contract shoring up key component failures/withdrawals on a nascent fleet. It bears mention that all 16+16 Mk3MRs were manufactured, tested and delivered by HAL to IN and CG within a very short timeframe under challenges imposed by Covid-19 pandemic, lockdowns etc. The CG ALH Mk3MR contract included Gen III night vision goggles (NVG) that, as per confirmed sources, have not been supplied till date. CG-863 was launched at night in the most adverse weather on the wings of a promised capability that hid many such gaps. A deep dive would have unearthed contributory factors such as dark night training, lack of NVGs, efficacy (or otherwise) of terrain awareness warning systems etc. The final moments of CG-863 could have been a moment of truth, but dead men tell no tales here. Again, did anyone see an iota of accountability or empathy from HAL officials on this terrible loss?

Control rods replaced, now swash plate fractures?

The Indian Coast Guard lost its second Mk3MR in four months when CG-859 crashed at Porbandar airport on Jan 5, 2025. All three crew members perished in the crash. This time the flight data recorder spoke unmistakably and the failure was traced back to a fracture in the non-rotating swash plate bearing (NRSB), a totally new phenomenon. HAL recommended that the fleet be grounded till the root cause was established. Eight months later, there is no evidence of any root cause having been established and the hit and trial continues. Based on some convenient logic unsupported by flight test data, skid-fitted ALH have been cleared to fly while wheeled variants from navy and CG remain grounded. For all such decisions, HAL has taken cover behind ‘DI Committee’ which comprises representatives from HAL, CEMILAC & DGAQA, all of whom share responsibility for the current state of affairs on ALH. The closed ecosystem of distributed unaccountability and conflict of interest remains unaddressed.

This is the only accident out of last four for which HAL has accepted responsibility, albeit in a roundabout manner pointing the finger back at usage pattern, operating environment etc. After more than 35 years of design, development, prototype, developmental trials, 4.5 lac flying hours and numerous accidents, HAL is discovering that seagoing helicopters are subject to marine exposure? How is this defensible in any industry let alone one that supports national security? Is marine exposure/usage pattern another red herring or does the NRSB fracture indicate a design or manufacturing flaw in the batch of 16+16 Mk3MR supplied to the navy and CG? One hopes the DI committee has looked into these aspects.

The panacea of one-time check

Even as recently as this month, Hindustan Times (HT) reported a new glitch on another critical component, viz. a tail drive shaft bearing mount that was found sheared during an inspection. This could have resulted in a catastrophic failure of the tail drive in flight. Another fleetwide one-time check (OTC) was ordered by HAL even as they doubled down on HT for presenting “a one-sided view with misleading commentary“. Their thread on X (formerly Twitter) again sought to play down the significance of such failures with generic advice & innuendo: “HAL reiterates that maintenance aspects are critical to the continued airworthiness of helicopters & emphasises that all maintenance directives must be followed scrupulously“. As per informed sources, similar failures have been detected at least twice in the recent past, thus avoiding an accident. The only proactive response from HAL seems to be a new-found micro-aggression of shooting the messenger with social media posts and press releases. It is HAL’s good fortune that military users who form a captive clientele have rules that forbid them from venting their product grievances in public.

“No One killed Jessica”

It has been over eight months since navy/CG ALH have last flown. One can only imagine the stresses building up inside a fighting force left with grounded choppers and idling crew. Yet, this is what CMD HAL has to say in the NDTV interview: “It will be a few months (before the entire fleet is up in the air) is my expectation. This variant (operated by the Navy and Coast Guard) – there are about 29 of them. Coast Guard has lost 3, and the Navy has lost 1. At the rate of 4-5 gearboxes per month, we should be able to do it in six to seven months.” That’s a total of at least 14-15 months before the navy/CG ALH fleet takes to the air!

From past experience, such predictions need a multiplication factor of at least 2-3 to make it realistic. By all estimates, users are staring at the longest-ever grounding of navy/CG ALH. Faced with difficult choices, this could turn into a “who blinks first” situation. Going by past precedent and HAL CMD’s latest assertions, it is not likely to be HAL.

Meanwhile, from all accounts, Operation Sindoor is still ongoing. A desperate navy is looking to seal contracts with civil helicopter operators to plug gaping capability voids. We live under the delusion that time is on our side. But the balloon could go up anytime. And nobody is responsible?

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© KP Sanjeev Kumar, 2025. All rights reserved.

Views expressed are personal except where quoted, written with a view to raise awareness and contribute to flight safety. Feel free to debate and contribute to the discourse. Please keep the comments respectful and civil. I can be reached at realkaypius@gmail.com or on my X handle @realkaypius.