What happened?

At about 2300h on Sep 2, 2024, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) air enclave at Porbandar, Gujarat, launched CG 863 an advanced light helicopter Mk3, to evacuate an injured crew member from Motor Tanker Hari Leela steaming about 22 Nm off the coast of Porbandar. The southwest monsoon was active off the Gujarat coast with strong winds and heavy sea. The moon in its dark phase had already dipped about 50 degrees below the horizon by the time CG 863 crossed coast on the mercy mission.

We can presume that the crew had some basic details about the vessel’s identifying features, location and weather in the area. Porbandar is a small coastal town. At that distance into the Arabian Sea, there’s hardly any cultural lighting or shore lights visible, making it the perfect pitch dark night. Add monsoon weather where sheets of rain dance on the windshield creating its own illusions and you are looking at one of the most difficult missions for a helicopter crew — dark night winch-up from a vessel at sea. At some point during the approach for medical evacuation (medevac), the helicopter crashed into the sea. It is not known if the crew sent out any radio calls or declared an emergency.

As per an ICG post of Sep 3 on X (formerly Twitter), “the helicopter had to make an emergency hard landing and ditched into sea“. One crew member, a rescue diver, was recovered and a search was launched for the remaining three crew members. The bodies of copilot Comdt (JG) Vipin Babu and aircrew diver Pradhan Navik Karan Singh was subsequently retrieved from the wreckage. At the time of writing this article, pilot-in-command Comdt Rakesh Rana is still missing. As per reports, the fuselage and cockpit were found inverted and suffered extensive damage while the tail boom had separated. The automatic deployable emergency location transmitter (ADELT) was retrieved while search is on for the cockpit voice and flight data recorders (CVFDR).

High-risk mission

In the grey zone that navy and coast guard often operate, a number of missions may be bundled under the generic term “night SAR”. Crew may be tasked to pick up a downed crew or capsized fishermen. It may include medical evacuation from a service or merchant vessel with or without a helideck. MT Hari Leela (file pic from vesselfinder.com below) has no helideck, meaning crew would have to winch-up the patient using a rescue basket. Limited preparation time, unfamiliarity with ship’s layout, an ungodly launch time, weather, dark night — all these would have loaded the dice against the crew of CG863. Should the planners have plotted the mission on any hazard risk assessment matrix, it would have occupied a “red corner” where the probability of risk and the severity of outcome both would combine to extract a heavy price for any active or latent failures. We do not know if any such risk assessment was undertaken or options to mitigate risk to acceptable levels considered.

Spate of accidents

CG863 crash marks the third accident (first fatal) on 16 each ALH Mk3 MR inducted by IN & ICG over last 3 years. In Mar 2023, IN 709 ditched off Mumbai due to control rod failure. In a frenetic scramble to contain the material failure (and bad press), urgent removal, inspection, and refitment/replacement of control rods was called for by manufacturer Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). In a test flight post one such refitment procedure, CG 855 crashed at CIAL, Kochi airport just weeks after the ditching of IN 709. Media reports indicate that lateral and longitudinal control rods were erroneously interchanged leading to the accident. Ironically, copilot of CG 855 Comdt Vipin Babu survived the crash only to perish in ditching of CG 863 eighteen months later.

Two back-to-back accidents on 16+16 brand new helicopters led to one of the longest fleet-wide grounding of the ALH in recent times. But seemingly the scrutiny was limited to technical aspects while exploitation of the helicopters in a wide array of tasks, hitherto beyond the capability of ICG, continued relentlessly.

As a keen observer of matters rotary and having participated and reported widely on the successes and failures of this stream, I intend, through this article, to contextualise the saga of ALHMk3MR for the reader even as a board of inquiry gets underway.

ALH Mk3 MR — a step change for ICG

For a service that held a humble inventory of single-engine Chetaks and four twin-engine ALH Mk1 (conventional cockpit with Turbomeca TM 333 2B2 engine), the ALHMk3MR represents a step change (MR for ‘maritime role’). The customized Mk3MR features HAL’s Integrated Architecture Display System (IADS) full glass cockpit, ‘Shakti’ (Safran Ardiden 1H1) turboshaft engines optimised for ‘hot & high’, and a host of new systems integrated by HAL’s Bengaluru-based Rotary Wing Research and Design Centre (RWRDC). The contract for 32 coastal security ALH was inked in Mar 2017 with ICG as the lead service and deliveries were completed by HAL in record time between 2021-23.

The Mk3MR has a busy cockpit at par with modern multirole helicopters from a higher category. While the navy had a deeper repertoire of experience in operating multirole helicopters, the ICG had to almost overnight transition to capabilities such as nose-mounted surveillance radar with Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Inverse SAR, Moving Target Identification (MTI) with classification functions that can detect, classify and track multiple surface targets, multi-spectral electro-optic pod, mobile intensive care unit, high-intensity searchlight, automatic identification system, deployable ELT, cabin gunning etc.

Performance Based Logistics (PBL)

The ICG also inked a ‘performance-based logistics’ (PBL) contract with HAL for “75% aircraft availability” of their MK3MR fleet. This was the first time a customized variant with tough PBL clause was offered by HAL to a sea-going customer. The PBL is reportedly costed at 45 hrs per month per aircraft, arguably a daunting flying task for ICG. Being in the offshore industry, I am familiar with operators flying 100-120 hrs per aircraft per month without PBL, but these are basic utility machines where the singular aim is revenue generation. These operators also have 5-6 pilots per aircraft whose only mandate is to fly, not stand watches or do sea time or station level duties. This begs some obvious questions — on what basis and at whose behest was the 75% and 45 hr/mo/ac calculus arrived at? Did ICG concomitantly ramp up the flight and technical crew to take on this formidable task? Did the annual flying task (AFT) drive the PBL numbers or did the PBL drive the AFT? Were the units able to deliver this mandate without succumbing to inordinate pressures?

Transition from simple to the most complex

Transitioning from a simple steam gauge cockpit with basic avionics to the Mk3MR generation comes with its own challenges. Seniority in rank does not automatically bestow advantages during a fleet replacement. A careful mix of total experience, glass cockpit experience, on-type experience, mission-specific experience, supervisory experience, day/night/NVG experience — all this has to be catered-for while preparing and deploying crews for difficult “red corner” missions. I had dwelt upon this in an earlier blog (2017) centred around a daring night rescue over sea wherein I lamented the disproportionate reliance on crew skills in an era of shortages and vintage equipment. That mission in an 80s vintage Sea King ended in saved lives and a gallantry medal. Seven years later, we have lost three aircrew in an almost identical scenario but in a modern aircraft using state-of-the-art equipment. These are two ends of a difficult spectrum blending man and material, one leading to tragedy.

ICG units operating the Mk3MR have saved many lives and undertaken numerous rescue missions. Most recently, the squadron that launched ill-fated ALH CG 863 had saved over 67 lives during the Gujarat floods. These tasks undertaken mostly by day must have undoubtedly given the crew a fair amount of experience. However, night changes the dynamics only those who have flown over sea will know. The criticality of night winching over a dark sea needs special emphasis here and I will briefly dwell on this.

Understanding the complex mission

Even by day, winching a patient or “survivor” from the heaving deck of a high-freeboard merchant vessel is fraught with complexities and many unknowns. The derricks, masts, superstructure, antennae all present a hostile environment requiring a helicopter like the ALH to hover sufficiently high where visual cues or a favourable “sight picture” may not be easily available. The sophisticated “upper modes” such as automatic transition down from cruise to hover (Trans Down), automatic hover (HOV), radalt height hold (H.HT) etc may not be employable due to the moving target. The ship’s course and relative winds may require a control handover at critical parts of the approach. Once a clear line of approach and hover is established over the designated area, the rescue basket has to carefully lowered clear of all obstacles onto the moving, heaving deck and the patient transfer completed. If all this sounds complicated, imagine executing the same by dark night from an unfamiliar vessel in stormy weather — precisely what CG 863 was attempting. It can easily be described as the acme of helicopter piloting. Unless guided by carefully drawn-up SOPs, and practised by day & night in varying light and weather conditions a number of times, this would be suicidal. That brings us to the next question: Did the agencies who tasked CG 863 for this decidedly complex mission have any idea what this entailed? Was there an approved ‘Night SAR SOP’ in place? Were the crew adequately briefed and qualified? Could not the medevac have waited for dawn or the ship asked to steam closer to shore?

Serviceability and failure rate of key components

The existing PBL contract between ICG and HAL ensures a high tempo of operations with a monthly target of 45 hrs per aircraft. It is assumed that this target has been arrived at based on envisaged tasking & crew availability. Spread over four bases (Kochi, Chennai, Porbandar and Bhubaneshwar), it would be in user interest that the 16 Mk3s fly as close to 45 hrs monthly per aircraft to extract maximum mileage from the PBL contract which, as per some estimates, costed ICG as much as the 16 aircraft itself! However, a newly-inducted fleet with many new systems is unlikely to hold up to this intensity of flying without something giving in.

In the wake of the first fatal accident, ICG needs to take a deep dive into the failure rate of key components / recurrent defects and corelate with flying intensity. It is an easy trap to normalise seemingly small defects under this tempo of flying and the exuberance of a new induction. These capable helicopters have not been purchased for landlubbers. Once they start fanning out into the deep dark sea, nature has a way of amplifying the effect of active/passive failures. For eg, the consequences of an MFD failure, engine chip or gear box overtemp miles out at sea on a rescue mission may not be the same by day and by night. The BoI will hopefully unearth contribution if any of technical issues that could have played an active or passive role in the run up to this accident. Analysis of historical data from the fleet should guide further deployment of the helicopter for complex oversea tasks while calling for necessary corrections from the OEM.

SOPs written in blood and last breath

There was a time, not too long ago, when night offshore operations in Bombay High were not formalised or guided by any specific SOP. It took a fatal accident (PHL Dauphin VT-PWF, Nov 4, 2015) for DGCA to come down hard on all offshore operators to collaborate and formalise a joint SOP for offshore night medevac. One of the most experienced pilots in Indian offshore (19000+ hrs) succumbed to the most fundamental traps (spatial disorientation) along with his copilot who was training for night deck landings. The joint SOP (for training/medevac only; no winching) developed with great diligence has stood the industry in good stead since. The SOP contains numerous checks and balances, qualifying criteria, mandated equipment, training curriculum, currency and recency requirements, minimum experience etc that preclude sudden impulses to launch. If a few competitors in civil aviation can collaborate and fall in line, one wonders why the ICG could not have drawn from the deep well of naval multi engine operations. Perhaps the silos in which services continue to operate have grown while osmosis of learnings has dwindled.

[This has further aggravated in the new age of ‘public relations’ where the daily stampede on social media makes the normal seem like an achievement while incentivising launches for the seemingly impossible. Somebody needs to audit the risk-benefit payoffs of such PR campaigns. In my view, it is a race to the bottom and incentivises impulsive and reckless decision-making.]

Use of Night Vision Goggles (NVG)

Today, NVGs are routinely used by all three services. ICG too would have bridged this gap if the contract to supply NVG kits alongwith the 16 Mk3MR was fulfilled in time by HAL. It is not as if the navy is flush with NVGs or that NVGs are the panacea for all night hazards. However, the naval ALH fleet, in their wisdom, decided to exploit the NVG-compatible cockpit of ALH by reappropriating meagre resources from other fleets to the ALH. Here again, a hasty attempt to address the challenges of night SAR with NVGs have led to some spectacular lessons in the past (a naval ALH descended and touched water during night hover on NVG; safely recovered ashore). Those lessons have now been firmly internalised and dovetailed into a staged training program that takes a navy ALH pilot through operational ground training on NVGs, a simulator syllabus and on-type training. ICG needs to investigate and answer why this promised capability was not inducted before allowing full-scale night SAR launches. It has cost us three lives and a multimillion dollar helicopter. How long more should your pilots wait?

Industry-User interaction

Lastly, I would like to bring up an issue that may or may not have a direct bearing on the current accident but often sets the stage for a gradual lowering of guard. The reader may like to ponder over its relevance or reject it outright, but I will still like to place it on record.

I have been part of many trials as a TP, both in India and abroad, on a wide variety of products ranging in complexity from a simple radio set to a fly-by-wire multirole helicopter. As customers, Indians traditionally abide by the principle of caveat emptor. This “buyers beware” outlook has served us well since there is often no single gold standard benchmark for quality around here. In such a context, a healthy distance needs to be maintained between OEMs and customers — somewhat akin to the separation of the judiciary and executive in a democracy, if you will (a contemporary example)!

The Mk3MR induction has no doubt renewed the flagging interest and engagement between HAL’s most “difficult to please” customer (navy) and their nearest ally (ICG). However, the effect of such a step change in capability would not be same for both customers. The specifications are identical, but the customers have approached the induction rather differently. For unknown reasons, the navy decided not to opt for a PBL thus relieving itself of the pressure of intensive flying (45 hrs). As per sources, the average utilisation rate of IN’s Mk3MR is almost half that of ICG. One may term it underutilisation but it has given the IN freedom to develop its SOPs, do due diligence and conserve its resources while proceeding on a path of caution.

The ICG has, with its overnight transition from simple to complex, in my personal opinion as an outside observer, stretched itself too thin on this new product. In an era of shortages, expanding to four Mk3MR squadrons in three years, while running one ALH Mk1 squadron (Ratnagiri) and legacy Chetak units cannot come without compromises.

Then there is also the “halo effect” of this quantum leap to account for. It is but natural to come under the awe of such a modern machine when all you have flown in the past are Chetaks and Dorniers (the ALH Mk1 were too far and few between). The ICG has hitherto reaped the benefits of observing the navy make their good and bad decisions and then following in the wake, adopting where required their best practices. In the public statements and unveilings that followed, it was evident that ICG and HAL were bent on forging a new relationship that departs from past precedent. Senior officers endorsing the product to virtue signal arrival of atmanirbharta, declaring additional numbers for procurement after hasty trials — all these reduce the agency of lower formations to voice valid concerns. In my experience, incestous relationship between a manufacturer and user is a sure recipe for poor oversight and its deleterious effects. This point is equally valid for all three services and their senior leadership regardless whether the product is imported or comes from the Atma Nirbhar Bharat stable. I will leave it at this.

Over to the BoI

I hope this write-up provides some context for the unfortunate accident. We must now wait for the investigation which is the only scientific method for unravelling the circumstances that led to the first fatal accident on ICG ALH. Truth and science has a way of bubbling up to the surface. And when it does, you want to be on the right side of facts. The true potential of this capable machine can be realised not by operating in safe corners or launching crew into harm’s way but by careful, calculated forays from the known to the unknown, always holding the aircraft and systems to the highest standards of performance and reliability.

Signing off with my homage to Comdt Rakesh Rana, Comdt (JG) Vipin Babu and P/Nvk Karan Singh. May their sacrifice not be in vain.

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© KP Sanjeev Kumar, 2024. All rights reserved.

Views expressed are personal, written with a view to raise awareness and contribute to flight safety. Feel free to debate and contribute to the discourse. Please avoid speculation and keep comments respectful of the deceased and their families. I can be reached at realkaypius@gmail.com. Photos from open source / ICG social media.