What happened

A Learjet 45 (Registration VT-SSK) of Delhi-based VSR Ventures crashed during the approach to land phase at Baramati airfield at about 0844h on Jan 28, 2026. As per a press note released by DGCA India, there were a total of five souls onboard, including two pilots, all of whom perished in the crash. CCTV footage from a camera installed at nearby Gojubavi village gram panchayat office showed the aircraft banking steeply to the left before slamming into the ground near threshold of Runway 11.

Crew qualifications

The Learjet had taken off from Mumbai’s Santacruz airport at about 0811h on Jan 28 with the Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra Shri Ajit Pawar, his personal security officer Vidip Jadhav and flight attendant Pinky Mali. The flight was commanded by Captain Sumit Kapoor, a seasoned pilot with over 15000 flight hours. First officer Shambhavi Pathak with about one-tenth of that experience (1500 hours) was on the training path to become a commander. Both held valid instrument rating (IR), meaning they had the requisite training and endorsement for operating flights under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). An IR endorsed pilot can also request for ‘Special VFR’ clearance when the meteorological condition is less than that required for entering or leaving a control zone under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).

Flight rules versus meteorological conditions

VFR and IFR are different set of flight rules under which a flight is cleared to operate. Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) and Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) are corresponding meteorological conditions defined by visibility, cloud ceiling and distance from cloud that are equal to or better than specified minima. For a layman, think of a dividing line between the two as a visibility of 5km below which VFR flights are suspended. In controlled airspace, the ATC may allow a VFR flight to enter or depart the control zone for the purpose of takeoff or landing under ‘Special VFR‘ clearance provided the visibility is more than 1500m and the ground/terrain is clearly visible to the pilots. Baramati falls under uncontrolled Class G airspace where only VFR flights are permitted and radio/ATC clearances are optional/advisory in nature.

Isolated field with no weather reporting /ATC resources

Baramati airfield is an isolated VFR-only airfield with no navigation or visual landing aids. The ATC tower is manned on ‘as required’ basis by one of the pilots from flight schools based out of its spartan premises. There are no qualified air traffic controllers, weathermen or officials from the Airport Authority of India (AAI) based there. The airfield is operated by the Maharashtra Airport Development Company (MADC). There is no published Area Navigation (RNAV) or GPS-based approach either. Under such cases, aircraft are required to operate strictly under VFR, meaning that when below 3000 feet or 1000 feet above terrain (whichever is higher), the aircraft should be clear of cloud, in sight of the ground or terrain and the flight visibility should be 5 km or more. The tower observed visibility passed on to VT-SSK on initial contact with Baramati was 3000m, clearly below VFR minima. Also note that horizontal visibility reported by the tower could be different from slant visibility experienced by pilots. An easterly approach (RW11) against a rising sun in low visibility could pose challenges in picking up vital orientation cues.

Changeover from IFR to VFR

VT-SSK would have departed Mumbai under a Yankee (Y) flight plan, meaning an IFR departure from Santacruz airport (VABB), enroute change of flight plan at a predetermined point to VFR, terminating in a visual approach and landing at Baramati. While flight management systems or GPS can bring you overhead the airfield, the only safe way for an aircraft to land at destination under such conditions would be to acquire the leading-in features and the runway visually, enter the traffic pattern and roll out on final approach, all the while keeping runway in sight.

Under some conditions, the pilot may elect to call direct finals or join the traffic pattern at some intermediate point (say, base leg) and then intercept the final approach (Mumbai-Baramati makes for an almost straight-in, direct finals for RW11 as winds were reportedly calm). For a high-speed Learjet 45 in approach category C, any manoeuvre that departs from the above and/or a loss of visual contact with the runway almost certainly means a “missed approach” or “go around”. That the crew of VT-SSK failed to visually acquire the runway on the first attempt to land suggests that conditions were near marginal or unsuitable for a visual approach to a VFR field. A prominent highway running parallel South of runway 11 has the potential to feed flight crew ‘expectation bias‘ under such circumstances.

VFR into IMC

The situation in the cockpit is not hard to estimate. Abandoning the mission and diverting means an unhappy, high-value client and possible loss of revenue (should not dictate crew decisions but it weighs on the mind). Going around means flying a traffic pattern and making a fresh attempt to acquire the runway visually. Therein lies a serious dichotomy. The Learjet 45 is a fast jet that will eat up a traffic pattern in under five minutes. How does one execute a missed approach, fly a traffic pattern (a purely visual manoeuvre) and align with a runway that was not visible five minutes ago? What could possibly change in that timeframe? As the unfortunate accident at Baramati tells us — only fate. Also recall that at such low heights, there is hardly any room for sudden manoeuvres, aircraft malfunction or an error of judgment.

IFR option not available at Baramati

An IFR flight to an airfield with navigation and landing aids opens up a host of options to the crew. They can fly published approaches with laid down minima down to a decision altitude/height or minimum descent altitude/height, follow missed approach procedure to enter a holding pattern, ask for radar vectors, try another instrument approach, or divert after two attempts.  On a fast jet, how do you make a visual approach to a place you cannot see? A late ‘runway visual’ could mean a delayed touchdown and a possible runway excursion. Even aircraft carriers have radar controllers and visual glide path indicators (Meatball) to guide jets down. Baramati had a runway owned by MADC, disowned by AAI, milked for money and connectivity by flight schools and powerful politicians who saw absolutely no merit in upgrading its facilities despite all the hype of UDAN, “flying for everyone” etc. Now dues have been paid in lives.

Hindsight is 6/6. It is foresight that matters

It is easy to say in hindsight that the flight shouldn’t have taken place or that the aircraft should have diverted. Aircraft can eat your balance sheet for breakfast when they sit idle on the ground. The turbines and rotors have to turn if people have to earn their salaries and go home to happy families. It is agencies such as MoCA, AAI and DGCA who must enable this basic need. But from my experience, all they end up doing after each accident is throwing more regulations at the problem and tightening the stranglehold. When that happens, small operators and general aviation (GA) are the hardest hit. For dubious operators with access to corridors of power, it opens new avenues for greasing palms & falling back on their “setting” with corrupt officials in DGCA and MoCA. One hopes that is not the case with VSR Ventures who seem to have already washed their hands off the occupants of VT-SSK while the report into their 2023 accident of another Learjet is still buried somewhere in MoCA.

When a small, 26-year old King Air C90 charter aircraft (VT-UPZ) undertaking a test flight crashed on 28 Jun 2018 near Ghatkopar, Mumbai while on a circling approach to land at Juhu airport (killing five), I made the grim prediction that till debris starts raining on ministers’ and regulators’ heads, such perilous encounters will continue. The latest, most unfortunate crash of Learjet 45 VT-SSK at Baramati and the long list of past crashes that have taken lives of politicians, ministers and senior military leaders shows that VIP flights are neither immune to the pitfalls in Indian aviation nor have they been the catalysts of change.

The last gate of safety under such circumstances is then the pilot. To them I wish good judgment, wise decisions in time and the moral courage to say NO when required. Because nobody has your back here.

(An edited version of this story was first published by The Quint. You can access it here)

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© KP Sanjeev Kumar, 2026. All rights reserved. Views expressed are personal, written with a view to raise awareness and contribute to flight safety. Feel free to debate and contribute to the discourse. Please keep the comments respectful and civil. I can be reached at realkaypius@gmail.com or on my X handle @realkaypius.