In a terrible tragedy, INS Brahmaputra, a frontline warship commissioned in April 2000, suffered extensive damage due to a fire accident on Jul 21, 2024. The subsequent firefighting efforts managed to control the fire but the vessel capsized in the afternoon hours of Jul 22. The MoD press release (reproduced below), crafted with many euphemisms, leaves informed observers in little doubt about the future of the magnificent “Raging Rhino”.
“A fire had broken out onboard Indian Naval Ship Brahmaputra, a multi-role Frigate, on the evening of 21 Jul 24 while she was undergoing refit at ND (Mbi), as reported earlier. The fire was brought under control by the ship’s crew with assistance of firefighters from Naval Dockyard, Mumbai {ND (Mbi)} and other ships in harbour, by morning of 22 Jul 24. Further, follow-on actions including sanitisation checks for assessment of residual risk of fire were carried out.
Subsequently, in the afternoon, the ship experienced severe listing to one side (port side). Despite all efforts, the ship could not be brought to the upright position. The ship continued to list further alongside her berth and is presently resting on one side.
All personnel have been accounted for except one junior sailor, for whom the search is in progress. An inquiry has been ordered by the Indian Navy to investigate the matter.”
Omnipresent dangers
Fire and flooding are omnipresent dangers on any warship. All three elements of the ‘fire triangle’ — oxygen, heat and fuel — are always available in abundance aboard ships. Managing these hazards within constrained spaces and enclosed compartments while running a daily exercise routine that includes deliberate forays into harm’s way is achieved safely through a combination of military grade ‘fit-for-purpose’ equipment, sound seamanship & engineering practices, and recurrent training of all onboard. IN ships sail today like never before; clocking thousands of miles in each commission; cumulatively totalling millions of nautical miles each year.
An alarming pattern
“A ship is safe in harbour, but that is not what ships are built for” is a quote often attributed to John A. Shedd, an American author and businessman. So when an aspiring blue water navy loses two warships and one submarine in harbour in thirteen peacetime years, it must be about time we sit up and take notice.
On 30 Jan 2011, INS Vindhyagiri suffered a collision with a merchant ship while entering Mumbai harbour. The now familiar pattern of catastrophic fire and flooding sent the ship to Davy Jones locker. Though salvaged at great cost and effort, the ship did not return to service and was decommissioned in July 2012. As per a CAG report, the Board of Inquiry (BoI) noted “lack of expertise in fire-fighting, non-availing the services of civil fire brigade and lack of coordination between Headquarters Western Naval Command (HQ WNC), Naval Dockyard and ship staff“, as the major causes for loss of the ship. A year later, night of 13 / 14 August 2013, INS Sindhurakshak, a Kilo-class submarine exploded into a huge fireball while being prepared for an early morning sortie on Independence Day, killing 18 personnel. On Dec 5, 2016, INS Betwa, a 3850-ton guided missile frigate keeled over during undocking with loss of two lives. Thirteen years after Vindhyagiri was refloated and dry-docked, Brahmaputra has keeled over — all this in the same dockyard. What are we missing?
Chapter III of CAG Report 20/2017 noted that “during the period from 2007-08 to 2015-16, a total number of 38 accidents occurred, which led to a loss of 33 lives of service officers/sailors.” There have been major fires and loss of life on surface and subsurface combatants since. The latest accident leaves us with a very disturbing set & dubious distinction.
While a BoI investigates the Brahmaputra accident, I will attempt to highlight a few salients of stability, nuances of warship refit, cadre management of key personnel vested with fire safety, and make some general points to raise awareness.
Stability basics
For the layman, it must be difficult to reconcile how an activity like firefighting meant to fight one calamity (fire) leads to another (flooding/capsize). A few basics of stability will help us understand. A ship floating in water responds to both internal and external moments. The resultant weight of the ship acts vertically downward through the centre of gravity (C of G). The resultant buoyant force acts vertically upward through the centre of buoyancy (C of B, located at the centroid of the underwater volume of the ship). While the C of G does not change unless any mass is added or removed, the centre of buoyancy shifts each time the ship moves or heels. Where the C of B moves with respect to the C of G essentially defines the stability characteristics of the ship. Addition of large amounts of water, free surface effect, or indiscriminate flooding while fighting a fire onboard can set up transverse or longitudinal moments which may ultimately sink the ship or keel it over.
Division of Responsibilities
The brief description of stability above brooks the question — who is responsible for overseeing efforts to control an unfolding disaster (fire) such that it does not lead to another tragedy (capsize). An ongoing fire fighting operation leaves hardly any time for stability calculations. But Vindhyagiri, Betwa and Brahmaputra went down in a dockyard teeming with engineers, vertical specialists and shore support of all kind. Interestingly, two of three tragedies (Vindhyagiri, Brahmaputra) occurred around weekends, a particularly inauspicious time where precious moments could be lost in the ‘golden hour’ equivalent of fire and flooding. Both ‘B class’ accidents happened in refit where lines of responsibility often blur and not everything is under the control of ship’s staff.
Refit risk management
Ships undergoing maintenance refits have to grapple with tall challenges. Such refits may extend from a few weeks to several months, even years, in the operational life cycle of a warship. It is a complex, time and resource intensive activity performed under immense pressure. Large parts of the ship are cut open, systems and subsystems are removed, replaced and re-installed post scheduled maintenance. Widespread welding, cutting and repair work leaves the ship extremely vulnerable to fire and flooding. One would expect a higher level of preparedness against these dangers during refit but often the reverse is true. Fire detection and major firefighting systems may be removed or turned off while fire sentries stand watch even as dockyard workers cut through the ship.
Since refits are mostly dockyard responsibility (on paper at least), the ship is an easy target for communal duties that operational ships cannot fill. Shore-based headquarter officials are squarely responsible for this malaise that exists to this day. Refit ships work under immense stress caused due to poor habitability, extraneous secondary duties, poaching of manpower by higher formations, and finally ‘inherited’ tasks which are actually the responsibility of dockyard and its civilian workforce (who incidentally are unionised and governed by more elaborate and protectionist rules). Add to this the fact that tenure spent on a refit ship does nothing to embellish your ACR or promotion prospects. If all this sounds like a ticking time bomb, you have a fair idea of the situation Brahmaputra found herself in last Sunday.
Cadre management of NBCD personnel
The pecking order of specialisations in the navy is clear to anyone who has served. It excludes the only specialist vested with complete knowledge and training for nuclear, biological and chemical defence, including firefighting and damage control (NBCD). Posted only on major combatants, NBCDOs are practically benched (career wise) the day they walk into NBCD School in INS Shivaji, Lonavla, while coveted specialisations like navigation and direction, gunnery, communication, etc. strut around the bridge. Successive hull losses and international embarrassments have done nothing to improve their lot. A few sailors who undergo key courses in NBCD are almost always spread too thin in a navy with global aspirations. What kind of Threat and Error Management or changes these precious resources can bring about is anyone’s guess. NBCD is practically an orphan since safety has no immediate payoff that can outrun a smart conning order or a missile’s direct hit. And when the unthinkable happens, we throw everything and the kitchen sink at the problem — with little success as revealed by the latest incident.
The daily fire exercise
All warships carry out a daily fire exercise to rehearse the drills for firefighting and damage control. It has a layered, ‘defense in depth’ approach against the two most dangerous threats. One would expect these drills to have evolved to a level of perfection over the years. Yet, per my last recall, (2014), it is often mundane and leaves much to the initiative and imagination of the officer of the day. The pattern i have seen where a smart engine room artificer takes to the general broadcast with a standard patter while the duty watch shuffle around with hoses and jet/spray nozzles is hardly impressive. Here again, the availability and agency of key sailors, NBCD instructors and NBCDOs, especially on refit ships, may need serious examination.
Deep introspection required
A warship or submarine is an amazing sight to behold even to the untrained eye. Years of service and flying off naval decks has not dimmed my sense of awe when I occasionally encounter these majestic steel hulks at sea as an offshore pilot. So when tragedy strikes and shocking images of a floundered vessel flood social media, it leaves me with a deep sense of sadness and anguish. I am sorry but I cannot be a mute spectator on a day like this.
Fire and flooding accidents onboard ships can only be minimised, never eliminated. The rising trend indicates that we are not on the right side of this balance and some major course corrections may be needed. I pray for the safety of the missing sailor and hope the latest tragedy triggers a larger discussion centred around the navy’s approach to fire and flooding safety. It cannot be business as usual. In any other self-respecting nation, the minister of defence or, in the least, secretary defence, would have stepped up and taken the lectern if not the sack. Perhaps this is too much to ask for today in New India.
An old anecdote
Lastly, I leave you with an old air force anecdote. Decades ago, as a young batch of graduating test crew, we staged a play aimed at our cerebral Officer Commanding Test Pilots School (OC TPS) who appeared rather detached from our daily travails (in actuality, he was a thorough professional and ace test pilot). The plot went something like this: It’s lunch break. Test pilots school is on fire. Attendant & defence civilian Kuttappan runs to the OC’s office and screams in his broken ‘Malayali Hindi’:
Kuttappan: “Sir, test pilot school me aag lag gaya!” (Sir, test pilots school is on fire)
OC: “Mainu ki?” (why should I care?)
Kuttappan: Sir, test pilot school aapka hai!” (Sir, test pilot school is yours)
OC: “Tainu ki?” (then why should you care?)
These days where art and drama hardly mirror real life and real life approaches drama, I hope we have not reached the “mainu ki, tainu ki” pass.
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©KP Sanjeev Kumar, 2024. All rights reserved. Views are personal. Cover picture credits Brian Burnell Photography via Wikipedia CC-BY-SA-3.0/Brian Burnell.
Well articulated as always Pisha.
A ship in refit is under pressure from various ends and for meeting various ‘requirements’. There’s really a need to introspect and align priorities.
It seems like 4 are to be blamed…. Everybody, Somebody, Anybody and Nobody. I am sure you all know about it..
An important job was to be done and ‘Everybody’ was sure that ‘Somebody’ would do it. ‘Anybody’ could have done it, but ‘Nobody’ did it. ‘Somebody’ got angry about that, because it was ‘Everybody’s’ job. ‘Everybody’ thought ‘Anybody’ could do it but ‘Nobody’ realized that ‘Everybody’ wouldn’t do it. It ended up that ‘Everybody’ blamed ‘Somebody’ when ‘Nobody’ did what ‘Anybody’ could have….
Well…. Sannu Ki!!!!
A warship lying on its side is a tragedy even if it is due to enemy action. Someone or something put the Brahmaputra on her side in peace time and that is a calamity of the highest order. I hope they find the root cause so that similar accidents can be prevented in future. Our prayers for the lone missing sailor and his loved ones.
Didn’t know this side until now. Deployment of combatants even when an operational equipment is under refit is unique to Navy, I guess. But it sure is not unique to Navy when a professional competence drifts being an outlier due to envrionmental priorities. Sad.
To the average landlubber a ship turning turtle and ending up on its port side seems like another accident. But I’m not the average type and though a Flight Safety guy all safety aspects one comes across are serious. Sanjeev as usual has been honest to call a spade a spade. Unfortunately heads that should roll will not. Scapegoats will be found. Let us hope this article gets the due attention it deserves.
Very professional article. Unless we fix the root cause and coordination issue and keep attributing blame on individuals, I am afraid we will keep landing in similar situation . I was witness to Vindhyagiri fire fighting efforts. Did we learn lessons since then?
Was reading your article again and got a little nostalgic
I was OOD (first duty) on a Sunday on INS Tir in 1995 at Cochin (now Kochi). I had joined after a stint in HQ ENC as Flags to CinC. Thankfully, I had joined a couple of weeks ago and the ship was undergoing workup with the next day, Monday, being the last day.
We had a fire in the galley (which became major), just after lunch when all had gone off for a siesta.
The response due to the ongoing workup was also evident in actions that followed. With tremendous and unconditional support from Uday Thapar, our coursemate, and ‘Papa’ Chow, a course senior to us, we were able to control it in about 4 hours. The cadets also really got into the act of FF.
Of course, all credit to CO, then Capt T Hari, to have left us alone to deal with the fire with advice being given only where needed.
Overall, we had kept in mind not to flood the ship beyond what was necessary. I was fresh from witnessing the Taragiri incident of overflooding while FF, a year earlier in 1994 at Vizag, so I was very particular about that.
We used buckets to throw the accumulated water trapped on the decks in compartments for boundary cooling the bulkheads or douse the odd smoldering parts.
Incidentally, the fitment of the ‘hotplate on-off indicator’ outside the galley, which is mandatory now, was a result of this fire!!
KPS, good stuff. Lots of questions beg answers. For now, my heart just goes out to the ship’s company and, more particularly, the one sailor who had apparently not been found yet.
No questions – it’s sad to see Brahmaputra on lying on her side like this. Particularly sad because I had the honour to command her in 2010-11. And, like many others, had started my naval career as a cadet on her previous avatar. So the very first ship I ever served on and also the very last ship I served on went by the same name!
Sir, was previldged to see you in command of B’putra in the WF. The ship handling bit I’ll never forget. Stern to approach on SBW outer side, hats off.
Thanks, buddy! Nice of you to say that. Such fond memories of association with Rashmi & you all through the Navy career!
There appears to be systemic degradation when I.N. loses 4 ships in the safety of the home port. The blame game on the OOD will not solve the problem. Apparently, the gradual erosion of seamanship at all levels of the Navy as an organization leads to such outcomes. The human factors scientist and author Dr. James Reason in his book ” The Organizational Accidents ” termed such catastrophic failures as organizational accidents, too. A system or organization very slowly drifts towards failure often unknowingly when the focus of the organization shifts to something not related to the organization’s very purpose of existence.
Of late, there have been posts in the SM that reflect changes. These changes impact the centuries of seawater-forged and tested norms.
I understand from the way the author of this article and other experienced officers explain the possibility and reasoning for the incident and the reasons attributable to various levels of administration from lower ranking sailor to the top brass.
Please note the following reasons which am sure are to be the main factors lead to this accident.
1. The fire was observed on 21st evening, means there was hotwork going on even on Sunday. Everyone is in a hurry to finish his job and return home.
2. Possible the person on fire watch and the worker must have left without securing hot work area properly which could have lead to a fire slowly by the residual heat. This is observed by some of the crew and people on watch responded.
3. Most of the people don’t understand the situation of a poorly ventilated compartment can initiate a fire even with rise in temperature below normal burning condition.
3. Deployment of inexperienced firewatch so that people could go home or liberty( Remember it was Sunday)
4. Sure thanks to the fire fighters from the ship must have done their job correctly but they must have observed it a bit late.
5. In that situation every firefighters from Dockyard and other ships have done their best by pumping water to put off the fire and cooling of boundaries suspected under fire including armoury ahd explosive storage.
6. Sure they all must have pumped the water on one side of the ship making it heavy on top and also more water on that side compartments.very
After putting off the fire every one sighed relief and cleaned the passage ways and accomodation spaces for sanitation purpose.
7.By the time the unevenly loaded compartments started making the ship list. The top weight combined with off centre loading made the ship to capsize and touch the jetty. Very less sideway force is required that to happen.
8. It could be having hull damage from jetty side while capsizing which aggregated the situation.
9. Please remember this didn’t happen because of working party, divisions, communal duties or other activities the command is asking every ships and itis same during 90s and now as well.
10. If Not my job syndrome is there in any organisation these are liable to happen.
I hope Navy is not infected with it
Jai Hind
We used to take pride and had immense self belongingness while serving serving onboard a ship. But somehow, towards the fag end of my service I felt general lack of the values which are required by everyone onboard to manage ever endangering ship’s environment.
I believe the Mainu Ki and Tainu Ki comment sums it up well. Somebody needs to sit and make amends religiously or else people will keep passing time as is happening..
Do not understand the Navy.But,the general report seems straight and clear.it gets dark as we read on.Sad and disappointing.
May we sail safe and free.
Initial reports indicate spread of fire through burning lagging through the length of the deck causing intense smoke and almost reduced visibility. Lagging fire is slow in burning and generates thick toxic smoke. Encapsulation of lagging by Aluminium foil, as in in domestic kitchen chimneys, could be a way ahead. Use of fire smothering balls with reduced water deployment could be a way ahead
Very sad to see INS Brahmaputra in this state, a ship that I had once sailed in for photography. I hope the Navy does some serious introspection and corrects these faults in ernest immediately.
Good read, KPS. The article highlights the tragedy in layman’s terms.
Such a sad state of affairs. Have we as a nation collectively lost our way ?. With so many officers, staff and other employees, we are not able to safeguard a warship during peacetime. Who will suffer ?. Common man. Blissfully unaware of the consequences. The just concluded budget allocated 19 paise per rupee we spend on defence. But such unforeseen events will change the equation. Who is responsible, accountable for lapses which is a dent in our exchequer. There should be a thorough enquiry and steps taken to prevent recurrence of such lapses.
This is truly heartbreaking news. The loss of INS Brahmaputra is a significant blow to the Indian Navy, given its crucial role as a frontline warship since its commissioning in 2000. My thoughts are with the brave crew and their families, especially the family of the missing sailor.
The dedication and courage shown by the crew and firefighters in their efforts to control the fire and prevent further damage is commendable. This is a reminder of the inherent risks faced by our armed forces daily. Let’s hope for a thorough investigation to understand the cause and prevent such tragedies in the future.
Hi KPS
As usual an excellent and a detailed article on the Brahmaputra tragedy. It makes u sad n anguished like u brought out loosing an operational ship alongside in peace time. Some really tough steps need to b taken to prevent these tragedies. It is really a sad event for me personally as I was Exo onboard the ship in 2009-10 and it’s hard to see our beloved Rhino lying on its side grievously wounded. It may take a while for it to b up n about in fighting state again. Thanks again Kps for a wonderful article.
I don’t know who you are but after reading this article, one thing is sure that you are one limelight focusing person. I admit all the points you brought out are logical , but to whom are we asking the question and who are the audience…Is this answer to be given by middle class readers who’s hard earned tax pay money has gone to drains because of internal highlighted issues or this is to tell you know the problem and solution both and present set of young blood is good for nothing. Amazing how people think when they are in and out of system. I too have an anecdote .. as it’s unfortunately legacy issue left by like minded people…. On 24 th when ship finally rested… an officer leading race for Admiral called his Lieutenants to discuss Navy night so when they saw it happening they were actually preparing for this coveted meeting at 1800 hrs … just a prospect…views are completely mine n not motivated by past experience… may God bless the shipmates of the ship
“mainu ki, tainu ki”, Sir, you concluding an “extremely” long artcile with this quip; an article which am not sure if a layman had enough interest to read (& understand); tells me that you want to put words in mind of people implying that “we” goofed up big time. You trying to correlate the present situation with your parting anecdote, is like you concluding the BOI yourself !
Sir, this article to me looks like a typical fence-sitter veteran article, a veteran who thinks he knows-all.
Sir, the present generation youngsters & leaders are as much committed & professional as you; if not more. Let’s leave the highly competent Navy to do their job, and not confuse public with “your version” of accident analysis.